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Europe’s renewable energy directive
poised to harm global forests
Timothy D. Searchinger 1, Tim Beringer2, Bjart Holtsmark3,
Daniel M. Kammen 4, Eric F. Lambin5,6, Wolfgang Lucht7,8, Peter Raven9 &
Jean-Pascal van Ypersele6
This comment raises concerns regarding the way in which a new European directive, aimed at
reaching higher renewable energy targets, treats wood harvested directly for bioenergy use
as a carbon-free fuel. The result could consume quantities of wood equal to all Europe’s wood
harvests, greatly increase carbon in the air for decades, and set a dangerous global example.
In January of this year, even as the Parliament of the European Union admirably voted to double
Europe’s 2015 renewable energy levels by 2030, it also voted to allow countries, power plants and
factories to claim that cutting down trees just to burn them for energy fully qualiﬁes as low-
carbon, renewable energy. It did so against the written advice of almost 800 scientists that this
policy would accelerate climate change1. This Renewable Energy Directive (RED) is now ﬁna-
lized. Because meeting a small quantity of Europe’s energy use requires a large quantity of wood,
and because of the example it sets for the world, the RED profoundly threatens the world’s
forests.
Makers of wood products have for decades generated electricity and heat from wood process
wastes, which still supply the bulk of Europe’s forest-based bioenergy2,3. Although burning these
wastes emits carbon dioxide, it beneﬁts the climate because the wastes would quickly decompose
and release their carbon anyway. Yet nearly all such wastes have long been used4.
Over the last decade, however, due to similar ﬂaws in the 2008 RED, Europe has expanded its
use of wood harvested to burn directly for energy, much from U.S. and Canadian forests in the
form of wood pellets. Contrary to repeated claims, almost 90% of these wood pellets come from
the main stems of trees, mostly of pulpwood quality, or from sawdust otherwise used for wood
products5.
Greenhouse gas effects of burning wood
Unlike wood wastes, harvesting additional wood just for burning is likely to increase carbon in
the atmosphere for decades to centuries6–16. This effect results from the fact that wood is a
carbon-based fuel whose harvest and use are inefﬁcient from a greenhouse gas (GHG) per-
spective. Typically, around one third or more of each harvested tree is contained in roots and
small branches that are properly left in the forest to protect soils but that decompose and release
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carbon. Wood that reaches a power plant can displace fossil
emissions but per kWh of electricity typically emits 1.5x the CO2
of coal and 3x the CO2 of natural gas because of wood’s carbon
bonds, water content (Table 2.2 of ref. 17) and lower burning
temperature (and pelletizing wood provides no net advantages)
(Supplementary Note 1)6,16.
Allowing trees to regrow can reabsorb the carbon, but for some
years a regrowing forest typically absorbs less carbon than if the
forest were left unharvested, increasing the carbon debt. Even-
tually, the regrowing forest grows faster and the additional carbon
it then absorbs plus the reduction in fossil fuels can together pay
back the carbon debt on the ﬁrst stand harvested. But even then,
carbon debt remains on the additional stands harvested in suc-
ceeding years, and it takes more years for more stands to regrow
before there is just carbon parity between use of wood and fossil
fuels. It then takes many more years of forest regrowth to achieve
substantial GHG reductions.
The renewability of trees, unlike fossil fuels, helps explain why
biomass can eventually reduce GHGs but only over long periods.
The amount of increase in GHGs by 2050 depends on which and
how forests are ultimately harvested, how the energy is used and
whether wood replaces coal, oil or natural gas. Yet overall,
replacing fossil fuels with wood will likely result in 2-3x more
carbon in the atmosphere in 2050 per gigajoule of ﬁnal energy
(Supplementary Note 2). Because the likely renewable alternative
would be truly low carbon solar or wind, the plausible, net effect
of the biomass provisions could be to turn a ~5% decrease in
energy emissions by 2050 into increases of ~5–10% or even more
(Supplementary Note 2).
Consequences for forests
The implications for forests and carbon are large because even
though Europe harvests almost as much wood as the US and
Canada combined, these harvests could only supply ~5.5% of its
primary energy and ~4% of its ﬁnal energy. If wood were to
supply 40% of the additional renewable energy—an uncertain but
plausible level—the wood volumes required would equal all of
Europe’s wood harvest (Supplementary Note 3). In fact, the RED
sets a goal to increase by 10% renewable energy for heat, sourced
overwhelmingly from wood, which would likely by itself use
~50% of Europe’s present annual wood harvest18,19. European
Commission planning documents projected somewhat smaller
roles for bioenergy based on lower renewable energy targets, but
they scale up to ~55–85% of Europe’s wood harvest at the larger
target ultimately adopted (Supplementary Note 4). Supplying this
level of wood will probably require expanding harvests in forests
all over the world.
The global signal may have even greater effects on climate and
biodiversity. At the last global climate conference (UNFCCC-
COP 23, Bonn 2017), tropical forest countries and others,
including Indonesia and Brazil, jointly declared goals “to increase
the use of wood … to generate energy as part of efforts to limit
climate change”20,21. Once countries and powerful private com-
panies become invested in such efforts, further expansion will
become harder to stop. The effect can already be seen in the
United States, where Congress in both 2017 and 2018 added
provisions to annual spending bills declaring nearly all forest
biomass carbon free—although environmentalists have so far
fought to limit the legal effects to a single year22,23. If the world
met just an additional 2% of global primary energy with wood, it
would need to double its industrial wood harvests (Table 1).
Why the RED sustainability criteria are insufﬁcient
Unfortunately, various sustainability conditions in the RED
would have little consequence. For example, one repeated
instruction is that harvesting trees should occur sustainably, but
sustainable does not equal low carbon (Supplementary Note 5).
Perhaps the strictest version of sustainability, often defended as a
landscape approach, claims GHG reductions so long as harvest of
trees in a country (or just one forest) does not exceed the forest’s
incremental growth24–27. Yet, by deﬁnition, this incremental
growth would otherwise add biomass, and therefore carbon sto-
rage to the forest, holding down climate change28. This carbon
sink, in large part due to climate change itself, is already factored
into climate projections and is not disposable. Harvesting and
burning this biomass reduces the sink and adds carbon to the air
just like burning any other carbon fuel. The directive only
requires forests to maintain existing carbon stocks in limited
circumstances, but given the size of the global forest sink, even
applying such a rule everywhere would still allow global industrial
wood harvests to more than triple (Supplementary Note 6)29,30.
The directive also repeatedly cites a goal to preserve biodi-
versity, but its provisions will afford little protection. Prohibitions
on harvesting wood directly for bioenergy apply only to primary
forests—a small share of global forests (Supplementary Note 5).
In addition, any forests could be cut to replace the vast quantities
of wood diverted from existing managed forests to bioenergy.
Some argue that increasing carbon in the atmosphere for
decades is ﬁne so long as reductions eventually occur, but timely
mitigation matters. More carbon in the atmosphere for decades
means more damages for decades, and more permanent damages
due to more rapid melting of permafrost, glaciers and ice-sheets,
and more packing of heat and acidity into the world’s oceans.
Recognizing this need, the EU otherwise requires that GHG
reductions occur over 20-years, but that timing does not apply to
forest biomass (Supplementary Note 5).
Instead, the directive incorporates the view that forest biomass
is inherently carbon neutral if harvested sustainably (Supple-
mentary Note 5). Although the RED requires that bioenergy
generate large greenhouse gas reductions, its accounting rules
Table 1 Wood harvest energy and potential demands
Region Roundwood
production
Harvest
volume
2015
(106 m3)
Energy
content of
harvested
wood (EJ)
Total primary
energy
consumption
2015 (EJ)a
Potential % of present
primary energy supplied
by 2015 roundwood
harvests
Plausible primary wood
biomass energy
required by new
directive (EJ)b
% of 2015 wood harvest
plausibly required for
expanded bioenergy in
2030c
Europe Industrial 333 3 70 4.3% 3.9 130%
Total 428 3.85 70 5.6% 3.9 101%
World Industrial 1826 17.9 571 2.1%
Total 3688 36.1 571 4.2%
aBased on estimate of 0.49 tDM/m3 for the World and 0.45 tDM/m3 for Europe and 20 GJ/tDM (Supplementary Methods)
bAssumes roundwood supplies 40% of mandated increase in Europe’s ﬁnal renewable energy from 2015–2030, which would be mandated by RED, 35% used for bioelectricity at 25% efﬁciency and 65%
for heat at 85% efﬁciency (Supplementary Note 3)
cAlso assumes Europe meets 32% target increase in European economy-wide energy efﬁciency from 2007 levels by 2030 (Supplementary Note 3)
COMMENT NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-06175-4
2 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |  (2018) 9:3741 | DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-06175-4 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications
ignore the carbon emitted by burning biomass itself (Annex VI,
section C, par 13 in ref. 31). They only count GHGs from trace
gases and use of fossil fuels to produce the bioenergy, which is like
counting the GHGs from coal-mining machinery but not from
burning the coal.
The main new Commission thinking, reﬂected in the sustain-
ability provisions, is that bioenergy rules do not need to count
plant carbon so long as countries that supply the wood have
commitments related to land use emissions under European rules
or the Paris accord (RED, Article 26, point (6)(1)(ii)) (Supple-
mentary Note 5). But this thinking repeats the confusion that
occurred at the time of the Kyoto Protocol between rules designed
only to count global emissions and laws designed to shape
national or private incentives32. Under accounting rules for the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
countries that burn biomass can ignore the resulting energy
emissions because the countries that cut down the trees used for
the biomass must count the carbon lost from the forest. Switching
from coal to biomass allows a country to ignore real energy
emissions that physically occur there, but the country supplying
the wood must report higher land use emissions (at least com-
pared to the no-bioenergy alternative). The combination does not
make bioenergy carbon free because it balances out global
accounting, the limited goal of national reporting.
But this accounting system does not work for national energy
laws. If a country’s laws give its power plants strong ﬁnancial
incentives to switch from coal to wood on the theory that wood is
carbon-neutral, those power plants have incentives to burn wood
regardless of the real carbon consequences. Even if a country
supplying the wood reports higher land use emissions through
the UNFCCC, that carbon is not the power plant’s problem. Only
if all potential wood-supplying countries imposed a carbon fee on
the harvest of wood, and this fee equaled Europe’s ﬁnancial
incentive to burn it, would European power plants have a
ﬁnancial reason to properly factor the carbon into their decisions.
No country has done that or seems likely to do so.
In fact, few countries have any obligation to compensate for
reduced carbon in their forests because few countries have
adopted quantitative goals in the land use sector as part of the
Paris accord33. Even if countries did try to make up for reduced
forest carbon due to bioenergy with additional mitigation of some
kind, all Europe would achieve is a requirement that its con-
sumers pay more to do something harmful for the climate so that
other countries could then spend additional money to
compensate.
Europe has also created a kind of reverse REDD+ strategy by
treating forest and all other biomass as carbon neutral in its
Emissions Trading System, which limits emissions from power
plants and factories. While the not yet realized hope behind
REDD+ is to reward countries for preserving carbon in forests,
this bioenergy policy means forest owners can be rewarded for
the carbon in their trees—so long as they cut them down and sell
them for energy. The higher the price of carbon rises, the more
valuable cutting down trees will become. Strangely, this policy
also undermines years of efforts to save trees by recycling used
paper instead of burning it for energy. Even as recycling polices
push consumers to save trees, this policy will encourage others to
burn them.
Alternative low carbon energy sources
Alternatives include various forms of solar power, which typically
generate at least 100 times more useable energy per hectare than
bioenergy even on good land—and even more on dry lands and
rooftops34,35. Possible future limits on solar if storage does not
evolve cannot justify bioenergy today. With solar costs already
dropping below $US 0.02/kWh in some world locations, and
offshore wind in Europe below $US0.06, solar and wind have
many economic advantages over bioenergy, particularly for
electricity, even with bioenergy’s incorrect GHG accounting36.
Unfortunately, these advantages are unlikely to fully negate the
political and occasional economic beneﬁts enabled by ﬂawed
climate accounting of simply replacing fossil fuels with wood.
Although some scientists support this use of forests24,26,27, and
the IPCC has found it difﬁcult to speak clearly about biomass in
the face of different views (see Appendix 11.13 in ref. 37), the fact
that ~800 scientists came forward provides hope of a clearer and
stronger message from the scientiﬁc community. The fate of the
biosphere appears at stake. Individual European countries still
have discretion to pursue alternatives to forest biomass. Whatever
their ﬁelds, all scientists who care should educate themselves,
overcome a natural reluctance to venture into a separate and
controversial ﬁeld, speak with great clarity and hold public
institutions to account.
Data availability
All data used or calculated for this comment are presented in tables in the main text or
supplement or are available from publicly available sources cited.
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